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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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INDEX

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Berlin/Germany
2. Congo
3. Nuclear Tests
4. Yugoslavia
5. Latin America
6. Soviet Comment on the Common Market

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

7. De-Stalinization Campaign Evokes Lively Discussion
8. The Kolkhoz and Garden Plots to Stay--At Least for a While
9. Permanent Commissions and Sub-Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet
10. A Third Trial in Leningrad: Three Jews Sentenced to be Shot.

MILITARY

(Negative)

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REPORTER

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO:		ACTION TAKEN	Noted	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE OF ACTION		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Berlin/Germany. As Chancellor Adenauer departed for Washington, Soviet propaganda stepped up criticism of Bonn, portraying it as a serious obstacle to fruitful negotiations on Berlin. The new Adenauer Cabinet was denounced as "the weakest yet" and criticized for having added personal representation of the Ruhr magnates (FDP members) to a cabinet already dominated by "revanchists" Seebohm, Strauss, and Schroeder. The object of the Chancellor's trip, according to Soviet press commentary, is to increase war hysteria and acquire nuclear arms for the Bundeswehr.

In contrast to the increased volume of anti-German material, the Soviet press has remained virtually silent on Berlin. A brief ADN announcement of the GDR measures taken to strengthen the wall near Brandenburg Gate was carried in the minor press, and no reference has appeared to the harassing and counter-harassing activities involving official vehicles in both East and West Berlin.

Concurrently, the Kroll affair has been cautiously reported in the Soviet press in such a way as to indicate Soviet endorsement of Kroll.

2. Congo. A major portion of the developments in the Congo has been reported indirectly to Soviet audiences through TASS reports of UN debates and commentaries on the UN commission report dealing with Lumumba's murder. The main point made is that continued instability in the Congo is attributable to Western support of Tshombe and the failure of the UN command in the Congo to act resolutely against Tshombe. A brief TASS report from Leopoldville recently revealed that the Soviets oppose the reinforcement of UN troops in the Kindu area. This report asserted that the ~~additional~~ dispatch of additional UN troops would be designed to hamper the advance of national army units into Katanga. Presumably, the Soviets believe that a strong UN presence in this area could interpose obstacles to any designs which Gizenga might have in that area.

3. Nuclear Tests. In reply to US and British notes of November 13, the USSR on November 21 agreed to resume negotiations at Geneva on November 28 on a nuclear test ban treaty. The Soviet note, however, carried an implicit demand for a moratorium on further testing by stating that the conduct of tests by any power during the course of the negotiations would compel the "other side" to draw appropriate conclusions with respect to nuclear tests.

4. Yugoslavia. On November 22, the Embassy received a note from the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitting a copy of the Soviet reply handed to the Yugoslav Embassy on the case of Lazo Vracaric, who was arrested by West German authorities in Munich on the basis of a German wartime law which was restored in 1961. The Soviet note supported the contention of the Yugoslav Government that the arrest was illegal and then proceeded to launch a propaganda attack against the Federal Republic of Germany.

In its summary of Czech Communist leader Novotny's report to his party, Pravda of November 22 included Novotny's comment that there could be no question of a normalization of party relations with the Yugoslav Party while Yugoslav

leaders continue to maintain their revisionist theses. Nevertheless, Novotny added, Czechoslovakia would continue to develop relations on a state to state basis.

5. Latin America. Pravda announced on November 24 that diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USSR were reestablished on November 23. The announcement added that it has been agreed to exchange Ambassadors.

US fleet actions in support of Dominican Republic Pres. Balaguer have evoked a spate of Soviet denunciations of "gun-boat diplomacy" and "intervention." The moves by American ships, according to the Soviet press, were designed solely to prevent the forces of the National liberation movement in the Republic from achieving a democratic revolution. However, it was predicted that the "patriotic forces" are uniting and the "Dominican people will be victorious."

6. Soviet Comment on the Common Market. The conclusion of the first round of talks between British and Common Market representatives in Brussels was ignored by the Soviet press except for one Izvestiya editorial (Nov. 20). Izvestiya recounted the problems facing the British and confidently predicted the amalgamation move will fail or at least cost the British dearly.

The British decision to seek membership in the Common Market has been studiously played down by Soviet propaganda from the beginning. A delayed and cautious commentary when Prime Minister Macmillan announced the decision in August dismissed the decision as unlikely to succeed due to the multitude of sources of hostility to the move.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

7. De-Stalinization Campaign Evokes Lively Discussion. Judging by the content of articles and speeches published in the Soviet press and by contacts American personnel had with Soviet citizens, a large part of the population has not been so aroused in recent years as it is now over the de-Stalinization campaign. While two Party leaders--the Komsomol First Secretary PAVLOV and Georgian CP First Secretary MZHAVANADZE--on November 17 continued to demand that the Party take action against MOLOTOV, KAGANOVICH, and MALENKOV, the issue of what should be done about the "anti-Party group" faded and the question with which Party propagandists grappled was: "Why was it necessary to revert to the cult of personality at the XXII Party Congress, when it had already been dealt with at the XX Congress?"

Both the Party theoretical journal Kommunist and Pravda, in an important editorial article (Embassy's A-374), dealt at length with this subject, revealing in the process some signs of concern that people might be asking themselves more fundamental questions about the effectiveness of guarantees against a return to the cult of personality. Both publications insisted that the new Program and Statute contain "further measures" which guarantee the strict observance of collectivity of leadership and prevent the concentration of power in the hands of individual leaders. Both are equally concerned to make a distinction between the cult of personality and "the authority of leaders," which is said to be "essential for our successful movement ahead." Neither succeeds

in making a case which could be expected to convince an even mildly skeptical reader that the boundary-line between "the authority of leaders" and the cult of personality has been so clearly defined and organizationally established as to rule out any possibility of a reversion to the cult. But the fact that these Party organs deal at length with this question is perhaps some indication of the intensity with which these subjects are being discussed, both in the Party and among more sophisticated groups in the population at large.

Reports from Stalingrad, now re-named Volgograd, indicated that people there were far from happy with the change. Their plaint was that, whereas Stalingrad had been famous before the Second World War because it bore STALIN's name, Stalin had been famous after the War because of the glory achieved by the "hero-city." In Georgia, where Stalin had become a symbol of the nationalism and latent separatism of a proud mountain people with a national history, the Party had a particular problem. There were rumors in Tbilisi about the destruction of statues of LENIN in the countryside, in a reaction of blind vengefulness. (Embassy's despatch No. 414). First Secretary Mzhavanadze addressed this problem with some candor at the meeting of the Georgian CP aktiv (Despatch No. 435), warning his countrymen that " we cannot ... have our own, somehow separate, point of view ... on the cult of personality of Stalin, simply because Stalin was a Georgian." Whether his arguments will carry conviction with this touchy people seemed doubtful, but, in the final analysis, there is not much the Georgians can do about it.

As the week ended, foreign observers in Moscow were in no position to form definite conclusions on probable future developments. There was, however, general agreement among them that the last had not yet been heard of the dictator whose ghost, nearly nine years after his death, still troubles the land.

8. The Kolkhoz and Garden Plots to Stay--At Least for a While. In his November 16 speech to the Central Asian Agricultural Conference, N.S.KHRUSHCHEV advised sovkhoz managers and kolkhoz chairmen to devote a really good piece of their land to a communal truck garden which could then grow bumper crops of vegetables, to be sold to farm members at cost, thus supplanting the function now fulfilled by private garden plots (Pravda, November 19, 1961). On the other hand, he warned that garden plots were not to be abolished "administratively" by zealous leaders "in order to boast about having followed the advice of Khrushchev" before an adequate supply of vegetables from other sources had been assured to farm workers.

Similarly, neither the kolkhoz nor the sovkhoz is envisaged as the final form of agricultural organization under Communism. Until the cultural differences between town and country are completely eliminated, both forms of organization are acceptable and the kolkhoz as a form of organization is considered fully justified (Despatch No. 434, November 24, 1961). Khrushchev advises "Never set off kolkhozy against sovkhozy. It is known that sovkhozy and kolkhozy are socialist undertakings. Both of these forms have great possibilities for increasing [agricultural] production" (Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 21, 1961).

9. Permanent Commissions and Sub-Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Pravda, on November 17, noted the activities of commissions and sub-commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with preparations for the next plenary session, scheduled for December 6, 1961 (Pravda, November 10, 1961). The commissions are said to be broken down into sub-commissions for consideration of separate items on the state budget and economic plan and organized according to economic subject and republics for the purpose of conferring with various responsible ministers. Separate sub-commissions are reported to be studying the implementation of the state budget for 1960.

COMMENT: The parallel with Western (and especially US Congressional) practice may well be deliberately calculated as an expression of the regime's stated goal of expanding the role played by the Soviets and further "democratization" of the system. In practice, the commissions have none of the powers to initiate action which characterize their counterparts in western parliamentary practice. As pliable tools of the regime, they are seldom heard of in the Soviet press, except in the context of providing a high-sounding title for some member of the Supreme Soviet who is hosting a foreigner. They are also used as the technical instrument for guiding the activities of the plenary sessions when the Supreme Soviet is in session. Thus, it would be in order to have budgetary or economic plan changes introduced at the coming session of the Supreme Soviet by these commissions.

10. A Third Trial in Leningrad: Three Jews Sentenced to be Shot. For the third time in three weeks (WEEKAS Nos. 45 and 46), results of a trial in Leningrad have been announced at which a majority of the defendants are Jews. Leningradskaya Pravda on November 17 announced the conviction of a ring of nine men accused of speculation in gold, foreign currencies, and valuables. To judge from their names, six of the nine are Jews. According to the report, "their criminal activities led to great losses to the financial and credit system of the Soviet Union."

Three were sentenced to be shot: B.S.OYZERMAN, A.G.KAPLUN, and S. Ya. SHAPIRO. The other six were given sentences varying from twelve to five years deprivation of liberty with confiscation of property. While there is no positive evidence that this trial is connected with allegations of anti-Semitism levied against the Soviet regime in the conduct of the first trials of Jews in Leningrad and Moscow for "espionage" (WEEKA NO.45), the regime displays a certain sensitivity on this point.

For example, in an article written for Izvestiya on November 21, 1961, S.SOLOV'EV, identified by Izvestiya only as Chairman of a Leningrad City Court, but in fact the Chairman of the very court that convicted the nine, discusses the problem of severity of punishments. He attempts to establish that "severity is not cruelty." Solov'ev writes:

"A Leningrad court recently looked into the matter of a group of bribe-takers. The court sentenced the two-timing currency speculator Kaplun to be shot, but his brother-in-law Trubnikov to six

year's deprivation of liberty. Incidentally, the law would have permitted sentencing even Trubnikov to be shot, or at least, would have permitted, say, giving him a ten-twelve year sentence. The court determined that Trubnikov was enticed into criminal ... cities by Kaplun, that is, he was his victim. Is it possible to say that the court was liberal with Trubnikov? I don't think so. The court sentenced everyone justly."

COMMENT: Such a statement may be useful in answering questions in the minds of Moscow and Leningrad Jews as to why Kaplun, a Jew, was sentenced to death, while his brother-in-law, whose name, at any rate, is Russian, escaped with a light sentence.

MILITARY

(Negative)

For the Ambassador:

Boris H. Klosson

Boris H. Klosson
Counselor for Political Affairs.

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